In 2009, the first influenza pandemic for 40 years developed due to the novel 2009/H1N1 virus and became a global challenge to modern intensive care medicine (ICM). In the critically ill cohort, young pregnant women were overrepresented. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] Pregnant women have previously been susceptible to influenza and have shown increased risk of complications [7] [8] [9] but at the time of the pandemic, experience in the management of this group of patients, in the critical care environment, was limited.
Intensive care clinicians were confronted with novel clinical problems and accompanying ethical dilemmas. The following case of a young pregnant patient with 2009/H1N1 pneumonitis illustrates these issues by exploring the difficult decision to perform a life-threatening procedure in the absence of consent and without knowledge of unequivocal benefit. While this case occurred during the swine flu pandemic, the issues raised equally well apply to the care of any pregnant, obtunded patients within the intensive care unit.
Case history
A 30-year-old pregnant woman presented to the emergency department of a major UK hospital. She was a mother with complicated care arrangements for her four existing children. Her partner, the father of the current fetus, was not the father of the other children but shared the care of her youngest child with the patient.
Gastroenteritis was diagnosed initially due to a history of vomiting, raised temperature, and anorexia and she was admitted under the gastroenterologists. She was referred to the obstetricians and a dating scan identified an anencephalic fetus of 15 weeks' gestation. Following discussion with a consultant obstetrician the patient elected to continue with the pregnancy, while accepting the eventual possibility of termination, and to delay any further discussions and decisions until she had recovered from her illness.
Shortly after the anencephaly was diagnosed, her symptoms became predominantly respiratory and progressed to severe respiratory failure. Influenza 2009/H1N1 was identified as the causal agent and anti-viral therapy started. She required admission to ICU for endotracheal intubation and mechanical ventilation 48 hours after admission. The obstetric team had no further discussion with the patient during this phase.
Despite critical care support her respiratory function continued to deteriorate and high frequency oscillation ventilation (HFOV) was introduced. Over the course of the first week the ICM team formally consulted the obstetricians on whether termination would reverse the negative impact of pregnancy on maternal pathophysiology and immunology, and whether it would be justified. The obstetricians felt that there was no clear evidence, at that time, that termination would improve the patient' s condition. Secondly, as she was in the second trimester of pregnancy she would require medical Termination of pregnancy without maternal consent during H1N1 critical illness R O'Leary, J Tay, V Nadella, A Bodenham, D Bell
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termination, ie induction of labour, which would pose an uncertain risk of complications in a critically ill patient. Moreover, there was debate about the patient' s clearly expressed wish to continue with the pregnancy and given the lack of evidence of unequivocal benefit they elected to delay the decision. The obstetric team (which included consultants in both fetal-maternal medicine and obstetrics) continued to review the patient daily, in part because they expected spontaneous termination and were monitoring for fetal movements, but also to maintain discussion with the ICM team about termination.
Definitive clinical decision
Over the next week the patient' s clinical condition worsened and despite full supportive care she began to develop complications associated with critical care. There was robust debate between the intensive care and obstetric teams about the benefits of termination. The intensivists felt that the mother was likely to die with progressive critical illness and as pregnancy was the only remaining modifiable parameter, termination should be considered even if there was only a theoretical chance that the patient' s condition would improve. Their concern primarily focused on the impact of a growing fetal-placental unit on immune function and the progressive cardiovascular, renal and hepatic demands of pregnancy. Furthermore, should the fetus die as a consequence of the critical illness it could act as a focus for sepsis.
The obstetric view was that while the effect of pregnancy on maternal physiology was well understood, the interaction with critical illness was difficult to determine and therefore the potential, but unquantified, benefits of termination would have to be weighed against a real risk of significant complications in the context of critical illness and intensive care therapies. Furthermore, any negative impact on physiology would not return to normal immediately after termination. Should termination proceed medically, and be unsuccessful, then surgical evacuation would be required. This would be very difficult to deliver in theatre while the patient was on HFOV, renal replacement therapy, and vasopressor support and would probably have to be performed on the intensive care unit. Should this lead to massive obstetric haemorrhage, there would be difficulty in managing this within the critical care environment.
These discussions continued between consultants in intensive care medicine, fetal-maternal medicine, and obstetrics. International expert opinion was sought, which confirmed that there was little experience that could be applied directly to this case. Moreover, there did not seem to be any clear data on the effect of early second-trimester pregnancy on non-obstetric critical illness, certainly no evidence that could be used to weigh the benefits of termination against the risks of potentially fatal complications. This paucity of information was mirrored in the limited information on the effects of anti-viral medications, high inspired oxygen concentrations, vasopressors, anticoagulants, and other intensive care supportive measures on fetal well-being. In fact, the obstetricians were surprised that the fetal heart movements continued to be visible.
Over the subsequent days, conversations with the family became more focused on the potential for a fatal outcome and termination was raised again. At this stage, the patient' s partner initially expressed a wish that termination not go ahead because he wanted the mother and baby to be buried together.
In law, the partner has no rights over the decision to terminate a fetus and clinicians have no duty other than to the patient. The courts have consistently maintained this view in cases where male partners have brought unsuccessful legal actions in attempts to prevent women obtaining abortions. 10 Furthermore, he was not the father of the other children in the family nor was he married to the patient and in some respects his views could have been dismissed. However, The Mental Capacity Act (2005) and the General Medical Council guidance are both explicit in their instructions to doctors who need to make a decision on behalf of a patient who lacks capacity; they must act on the basis of the patient' s best interests and must consider the views of the patient' s proxy which may be either next of kin, a person holding lasting power of attorney, or an independent mental capacity advocate. These instructions broadly cover the role of the proxy in aiding doctors as they attempt to establish what the patient would want rather than having a role in directing therapy. In any case it is an essential part of intensive care medicine, that a consensual approach is taken with the family when establishing a framework for subsequent difficult decisions.
Interestingly, the father rapidly chose to exclude himself from decisions which would typically involve the next of kin and he asked that the clinicians undertook these discussions with the patient' s mother. The obstetricians had a frank discussion with the patient' s mother who was content for the clinical teams to do whatever was required to save her daughter' s life. At this stage it was also agreed that the patient' s previously expressed wishes with regard to the continuation of pregnancy and termination had been expressed in entirely different circumstances and could not be considered an advance directive.
In other respects, the legal aspects of this case were relatively straightforward. The Abortion Act (1967) permits termination under a number of circumstances, at least two of which are relevant to this case. The fetus could have been aborted on the basis of there being a 'substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped' which could have permitted earlier termination due to the diagnosis of anencephaly. However, the obstetricians felt that the requirement that 'the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the pregnant woman greater than if the pregnancy were terminated' was appropriate once it had been established that there were no further ICM interventions available. While the lack of further treatment is not a requirement of the Act, their view was that the risk of termination was unknown and potentially significant in the presence of critical illness and that only once it was clear that the treatment options had been exhausted were they satisfied that continuing with the pregnancy exposed the mother to greater risk than termination. The Act also provides scope for a single clinician to perform a termination as an emergency to save the life of the mother. All members of the clinical teams agreed, however, that there was never a point at which there was sufficient evidence to allow this to be done.
Following further deterioration and renewed discussion between the appropriate clinical teams and the family, medical termination took place on day 17 following ICU admission with delivery of the fetus 24 hours later. The patient' s condition slowly improved and she was discharged from ICU six days later with a tracheostomy to aid weaning from ventilatory support. Her subsequent recovery was uneventful.
Subsequent debate
After this case a series of observational studies of pregnant women infected with H1N1 during the 2009 pandemic were published. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] These demonstrated that pregnant women were frequently admitted to ICU following swine flu infection and exhibited increased mortality and poor perinatal outcomes. However, the majority of pregnant patients admitted to ICU were subsequently discharged still pregnant and delivered successfully. It is not certain, however, whether delivery or termination improves the clinical condition of mothers with swine flu pneumonitis. At best, we have observational data indicating that patients who undergo termination or delivery survive H1N1 critical illness.
We have debated widely whether the decision to terminate the fetus was correct, and we present this report to further that debate. We now know that the rate of maternal mortality was lower than perhaps expected at the time and it may have been preferable not to terminate the pregnancy. We have speculated that this decision was easier because the fetus was ultimately non-viable. The corollary question is, should the pregnancy have been terminated sooner, potentially avoiding the consequences of prolonged critical illness and allowing earlier return to normal non-pregnant physiology. We have noted that had we not terminated the fetus the patient would have needed to labour to deliver the fetus while recovering from her critical illness. While we did not perform the termination for this reason, it is possible to advance a pragmatic argument that the patient benefited from avoiding the physiological and emotional burden of termination and labour.
It is arguable, however, that our approach was unwarranted and may have caused harm. Survivors of critical illness already show an increased incidence of mental health problems 11, 12 and we potentially exacerbated the likelihood of mental illness in this case. Disregarding a birth plan without consent can lead to debilitating emotional consequences in women 13 and it is probable that this would extend to decisions taken about all aspects of pregnancy. We are mindful of the mother' s wish to delay decisions about termination until she recovered from her illness. It is also possible that had the patient died, the remaining children could advance an argument that the decision-making process had been incorrect or inappropriately prolonged and on that basis take legal action for loss of their mother.
Our view remains that in the absence of clear, unequivocal benefit, it is unacceptable to perform a procedure associated with potentially fatal complications. The decision did take time but during that time full ICM care continued and broad council was taken to determine the safe, clinically sound, and ethically justified treatment path.
Concluding comments
Consent, autonomy, non-maleficence and beneficence are the ethical cornerstones around which modern medicine is assembled. Nevertheless, it is accepted that there will be situations where doctors may act in the absence of consent, or disregard autonomy, or even treat a patient in a manner that may cause harm. However it is very rare that all three concepts need to be rejected simultaneously while being unable to demonstrate benefit.
The ethical aspects of this `case seemed, at the time, to be clear-cut in contrast to the clinical decision-making. The debate during the management of this case was in fact largely clinical rather than ethical and once consensus was reached the ethical shortcomings were accepted as necessary.
Ultimately however, this decision has to stand up to the scrutiny of being clinically sound, ethically justified and to the patient' s benefit. Arguably, we did not fulfil these criteria. To present an alternative view, we treated a complex patient in the presence of a consensus formed by a large number of experts where no evidence exists, with a satisfactory clinical outcome. Expert opinion is likely to be the best level of evidence to guide these decisions and it seems certain that similar situations will develop in the current and future epidemics. Our view is that the correct decision was taken but we are sympathetic to the criticism that our discussions caused an unwarranted delay.
While we now understand the epidemiology, genetics and clinical medicine of the H1N1 pandemic it is easy to overlook the desperately difficult periods that families endured due to a disease which affects so many pregnant women. This case may give some insight to the challenging decisions that were taken across the world over the last two years.
